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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

762.0221/12-258

XR 762a.6

FROM : American Embassy Bonn

EUR INDEX

854

COPY NO

SERIES A

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON

December 2, 1958

REF : Embtel to Dept. 1111, November 25, 1958

2/3/59 - NPN  
Em: Gu: gpa: EW

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	REC'D	OTHER
12/6	EUR 5	RM/R, IRC*, E*, S/S*, G*, S/P*, C*, SCA*, L, WOP CIA*, OSD*, ARMY*, NAVY*, AIR*, OCB

SUBJECT: Tripartite "Garrison Airlift" Plan

As reported in ref tel a meeting was held at the American Embassy Bonn on November 24 between the Political Counselors of the Three Embassies, the three Civil Air Attaches, the U.S. Air Attache, and representatives of the three Air Forces. The USAFE delegation was headed by Brig. General Benjamin O. Davis from ADVON.

The Political Counselors asked the group to plan for the following two situations: (1) Allied surface access interrupted (for whatever reason) but civil airlines operating and German surface access unaffected. (2) Same as in (1) above but with civil airlines not operating. In addition the group was to assume (a) no Soviet/GDR jamming, and (b) maximum Soviet/GDR jamming effort.

Taking the U.S. draft as a working paper the group evolved a tripartite plan, 20 copies of which are attached as enclosures to this despatch.

Attached to the U.S. draft was an Annex on "Possible Soviet Courses of Action Against Allied Air Access to Berlin" which was circulated to all participants but which was not discussed at the meeting. Five copies of the draft Annex are attached for Department's information and consideration. The Annex attempts to isolate certain questions, especially concerning civil aircraft, which must be answered at the Governmental level if we are to plan on using our civil air fleets which currently provide 90% of our Berlin air access.

For the Ambassador:

William C. Ockey  
Counselor of Embassy for  
Economic Affairs

JM  
MH  
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NO 901040  
4/18/91  
HR-M/59

Enclosures: (a) 20 copies Tripartite Garrison Airlift Plan.  
(b) 5 copies U.S. draft annex to U.S. draft plan.

Coord. POL - RWellington

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Bonn - 12/2/58 Copy #2

TRIPARTITE "GARRISON AIRLIFT" PLAN

For the purposes of this plan it must be assumed that (1) Allied access to Berlin is interrupted (for whatever reason) but that civil airlines continue to operate and that German surface access is unaffected. (2) Same as in (1) above, but with civil airlines not operating. In addition plan must assume (a) no Soviet/GDR jamming effort against Berlin navigational aids, and (b) complete jamming effort by Soviet/GDR.

The "Garrison Airlift" plan would have as its aim the supplying by air of the following transport needs under any of the above assumed conditions:

- (a) Needs of U.S., U.K., and French Garrisons
- (b) Certain non-allied essential transport
- (c) Non-official transport "to the greatest extent possible"

For planning purposes the following daily requirements were established:

- (1) Category One: (U.S. Garrison) 60 tons inbound, 10 tons outbound, 100 official travelers each way (25 duty, 75 leave)
- (2) Category Two: (U.K. Garrison)  $44\frac{1}{2}$  tons inbound, 5 tons outbound, 45 official travelers each way.
- (3) Category Three: (French Garrison) 21 tons inbound, 2 tons outbound, 41 official travelers each way.
- (4) Category Four: (Non-Allied Essential) 5 tons German mail each way, 50 official travelers each way, 350 refugees outbound only (i.e., no additional capacity required) (each refugee and his baggage equal 300 pounds).
- (5) Category Five: (Non-official "to greatest extent possible") No exact figure, but all such traffic would be two-way traffic and would require one aircraft sortie for each 60 non-official travelers. To show to what magnitude this category could be expanded, it is noted that the three civil airlines currently carry about 1200 paying passengers each way and this much lower than the recent summer months.

For planning purposes, the above requirements are converted into aircraft sorties as follows:

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- (2) Category Two: (U.K. Garrison) 5 loads inbound and 1 load outbound using Beverlies or 9 inbound and 2 outbound using Hastings.
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- (4) Category Four: (Non-Allied essential) This requirement would be divided three ways (except German mail which is solely a U.S. requirement) with the result that 1 additional inbound load will be added to the U.S. loads and no additional loads will be added to the U.K. and French loads.

For the purposes of a "Garrison Airlift" the following aircraft would be available: (within 24 hours notice)

- 2 -

(a) CIVIL: PAA - 8 C-54s (60 seat plus mail plus freight capacity); BEA - 3 Viscounts (60 seat plus mail plus freight capacity); U.K. Handysides - 2 to 3 DC-3s (2 1/2 tons capacity) and 1 York (8 tons or 59 seats); Air France - 3 to 4 C-54s (60 seat plus mail plus freight capacity).

(b) MILITARY: U.S. - 15 C-130s (15 tons or 65 seats) and 5 C-124s (18 tons or 85 seats) or their equivalents.\* U.K. - has no transport aircraft in 2nd TAF but the Air Ministry could make available within 24 hours sufficient aircraft to supply the needs of the U.K. Garrison plus so much of the Category Five lift as the U.K. Government decided they should carry, i.e. "Greatest extent possible" would be left to the U.K. Government to decide in making additional aircraft available.\*\* France - also has no transport aircraft in Germany but would draw from a military pool in Paris. As with the U.K. the FAF would have sufficient aircraft to lift the requirements of the French Garrison, but the determination of "greatest extent possible" for Category Five would be made by the Government in allocating aircraft for this plan\*\*\*

Operations: Under conditions of situation (1) (including civil carriers) each Air Force will lift its own garrison's requirements as an internal matter and there need be no tripartite organization to direct the garrison airlift. Category Four and Category Five goods and travelers would be lifted by civil air carriers.

Under conditions of situation (2) (no civil carriers) there would have to be only (initially) a 4-power committee. The members from the Three Embassies (not specified) would notify the FedRep member (presumably von Derrier who is chairman of the German delegation of BEALCOM) of the lift capacity available for Categories Four and Five and the FedRep member would be responsible for nominating, bringing to the loading point, and paying for Category Four and Five goods and travelers.

Accounting: Since the Berlin Garrisons are maintained out of special Berlin occupation cost funds, the Three Embassies may later decide to ask the FedRep to finance the "garrison airlift"; therefore it was agreed that each Air Force would maintain adequate cost accounting records for all airlift provided under the garrison airlift.

All requirements expressed thus far have been based on the assumption of no jamming by Soviet/GDR. If complete jamming is to be assumed (as in situation 2(b) laid down by the political counselors) it was agreed to use the BEALCOM formula of a 50% increase of capacity over plan to provide planned lift under only VFR marginal conditions (i.e., maintaining a weekly or monthly quota by flying only on "good" days).

\* USAFE explained that this represents a "holding back" because of USAFE's responsibility to maintain a certain military posture vis-a-vis other USAFE-wide requirements, some of which are expected to be concurrent with a Berlin "garrison airlift." In extreme cases additional aircraft could be made available for limited periods. Even 60 aircraft could be provided if necessary to protect the vital interests of the U.S., but the aircraft listed above appeared to be adequate to airlift the requirements of the U.S. Garrison plus their share of the non-allied requirements. It was further noted that USAFE would try to have at least one aircraft ready to operate immediately (i.e., one hour notice) if necessary to demonstrate that we have not abandoned the Allied air corridors.

\*\* Although the following aircraft are not to be presumed to be available for this plan it is noted for sake of comparison that the U.K. Air Ministry has planned to make available immediately for a BEALCOM situation 6 Hastings and 6 Beverlies, these to be augmented as BEALCOM built up.

\*\*\* If the French military aircraft pool in Paris shall have been depleted by other emergencies, French Government will substitute civil aircraft which will be operated under charter to and under the control of the FAF.

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ANNEX TO GARRISON AIRLIFT PLAN

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SUBJECT: POSSIBLE SOVIET COURSES OF ACTION AGAINST ALLIED AIR  
ACCESS TO BERLIN - AND ALLIED REACTIONS TO THE

[Considering that the initiative in the current Berlin "crisis" lies with the Soviet element, and considering that the initial Allied reactions to Soviet/GDR moves may be of the greatest importance, it becomes necessary for the Three Western elements to consider the possible Soviet courses of action concerning Allied air access to Berlin and, in so far as possible, to agree on counteractions to be taken by our respective elements and, where necessary, to refer to our respective Governments for immediate decision those questions which are of a national policy nature.

Allied air access to Berlin amounts to approximately 3,000 flights per month, over 90% of which are by civil aircraft. All Allied civil and military flights are radar controlled while in the air corridors by the Berlin Air Traffic Control Center (BATCC) which is located at Tempelhof and is staffed by USAF personnel. Flight clearance and in-flight air traffic control information is passed to Allied aircraft only by BATCC. However flight information, in the form of a simulated flight plan, is also passed to the Soviet element in the Berlin Air Safety Center (BASC). The Soviets do not file flight information in BASC on their aircraft flying across or within the corridors but in lieu thereof have developed a procedure of initialing Allied flight plans in BASC - this initialing has come to be known as the "Soviet guarantee of flight safety". BASC has no direct communication with aircraft - if BASC wishes to pass a message to an Allied aircraft it must telephone BATCC and request BATCC to pass the message to the aircraft.

Soviet action against our air access can be grouped under the following four general categories:

I. SOVIET STATEMENTS OR ACTIONS IN THE BERLIN AIR SAFETY CENTER (BASC) WHICH AMOUNT TO A "REFUSAL TO GUARANTEE THE SAFETY OF FLIGHT" OF ALLIED CIVIL AND/OR MILITARY AIRCRAFT.

A. MILITARY AIRCRAFT: It has been agreed, and is currently confirmed by practice, that Soviet statements of "no guarantee of safety" have no influence on Allied military aircraft. Allied military aircraft

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# TRANSCRIPTION - ORIGINAL FOLLOWS

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would continue to operate without regard to such Soviet statements, and if statements were made while aircraft were in flight, the Soviet statements would not be communicated to military pilots.

B. CIVIL AIRCRAFT A decision is needed by Governments as to whether or not civil aircraft should continue to operate in the face of a Soviet "refusal to guarantee safety" of Allied flights. [Note: the U.S. Government has taken the view that the Three Embassies should:

"Exert every effort to persuade the civil carriers to continue their operations regardless of Soviet refusal to 'guarantee flight safety', provided we would not be asking them to assume abnormal risks."

If the Three Embassies agree that "abnormal risks" would be involved in our civil carriers continuing to operate in the face of Soviet refusal to guarantee, then the Three Embassies would have to seek their respective Governments decision whether to:

(i) Insure their civil operators against damage or other liability which might result from operations in the face of a Soviet refusal to guarantee safety, or to

(ii) Provide (military) crew members for the civil carriers in conjunction with (i) above, or

(iii) As a last resort and only if the essential needs of Berlin cannot be met by other means of transport, to substitute military for civil aircraft.

2. SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM BASC, WITH OR WITHOUT AN ATTEMPT TO SUBSTITUTE GDR PERSONNEL FOR SOVIET PERSONNEL AT BASC. [Note: It has been agreed that GDR personnel would be expelled from BASC if any sub-situation were attempted.]

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RE CIVIL AIRCRAFT: A decision is needed by Government as to whether or not civil aircraft should continue to operate in the face of a Soviet "refusal to guarantee safety" of Allied flights. [Note: The U.S. Government has taken the view that the Three Embassies should:

"Exert every effort to persuade the civil air carriers to continue their operations regardless of Soviet refusal to 'guarantee flight safety', provided we would not be asking them to assume abnormal risks".

If the Three Embassies agree that "abnormal risks" would be involved in our civil carriers continuing to operate in the face of Soviet refusal of guarantee, then the Three Embassies would have to seek their respective Governments decision whether to:

(i) Insure their civil operators against damage or other liability which might ~~exist~~ result from operations in the face of a Soviet refusal to guarantee safety, or to

(ii) Provide (military) crew members for the civil carriers in conjunction with (i) above, or

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## TRANSCRIPTION - ORIGINAL FOLLOWS

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A. MILITARY AIRCRAFT: It is agreed that a Soviet withdrawal from BASC would have no influence on Allied military aircraft. Allied military aircraft would continue to operate and if the Soviet withdrawal occurred while aircraft were in flight, the Soviet withdrawal would not be communicated to Allied military pilots.

B. CIVIL AIRCRAFT: A decision is needed by Governments just as in 1.B. above. Soviet withdrawal from BASC may or may not be coupled with statements of "no guarantee", or even statements containing implied or specific threats to use force against Allied aircraft. Since no practical purpose would be served by trying to anticipate the variety of statements that could be made, it needed only be noted that the decisions by Governments under 1. or 2. above should be sufficiently broad as not to be voided by Soviet statements containing express or implied threats.

Irrespective of whatever action is taken under 2. above, a statement along the following lines will be made by the Allied controllers in BASC to the Soviets if and when the Soviets withdraw from BASC"

"You are hereby on notice that the aircraft of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France will continue to operate normally in the Berlin air corridors; that the U.S., U.K., and French controllers will continue to make flight information available to the Soviet Controller's desk as if the Soviet element were present to receive such flight information. The Soviet element's physical withdrawal from BASC will not relieve the Soviet [Government] [element] of its responsibility for the safety of United States, United Kingdom, and French aircraft in the Berlin air corridors and Berlin control zone. The Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France will continue to hold the Soviet Government responsible if the safety of flight of our aircraft is [threatened?]."



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A. "MILITARY" AIRCRAFT: It is agreed that a Soviet withdrawal from BASC would have no influence on Allied military aircraft. Allied military aircraft would continue to operate and if the Soviet withdrawal occurred while aircraft were in flight, the Soviet withdrawal would not be communicated to Allied military pilots.

B. CIVIL AIRCRAFT: A decision is needed by Governments such as in 1. B. above. Soviet withdrawal from BASC may or may not be accompanied with statements of "no guarantee", or even statements containing explicit or specific threats to use force against Allied aircraft. Since no practical purpose would be served by trying to anticipate the various statements that could be made, it need only be noted that the decisions by Governments under 1. or 2. above should be sufficiently broad as not to be voided by Soviet statements containing explicit or implied threats.

Irrespective of whatever action is taken under C. above, a statement along the following lines will be made by the Allied controllers in reply to the Soviets if and when the Soviets withdraw from BASC:

"You are hereby on notice that the aircraft of the United States, the United Kingdom and France will continue to operate normally in the Berlin air corridors; that the U.S., U.K. and French Controllers will continue to make flight information available to the Soviet Controller's desk as if the Soviet element were present to receive such flight information. The Soviet element's physical withdrawal from BASC will not relieve the Soviet [Government] [element] of its responsibility for the safety of United States, United Kingdom and French aircraft in the Berlin air corridors and Berlin control zone. The Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France will continue to hold the Soviet Government responsible if the safety of flight of our aircraft is

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PARTIAL TRANSCRIPTION - ORIGINAL FOLLOWS

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3. SOVIET/GDR JAMMING OF ALLIED BERLIN NAVIGATIONAL AIDS AND/OR LANDING AIDS. Jamming as used here would include "decoying" on false

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3. ~~SOVIET/RED JAMMING OF ALLIED BERLIN NAVIGATIONAL AIDS AND/OR~~  
~~LANDING AIDS.~~ Jamming as used here would include "decoying" on false  
courses as well as interference by non-directional transmissions on  
the same frequencies as Allied navigational and/or landing aids. Jamming  
may occur in conjunction with numbers 1 and/or 2 above, or independent  
thereof.

A. **MILITARY AIRCRAFT:** It is agreed that if electronic jamming  
occurs military aircraft will be governed by their respective Air Force's  
scale of minima. We can assume that jamming will be noticed immediately  
by the personnel operating the Berlin radars and the the personnel monitor-  
ing the other nav aids. Any jamming will be reported immediately to the  
BATOC Commander. Whenever jamming is reported to the BATOC Commander, he  
(or other here designated) shall make a determination as to the useability  
or non-useability of nav aid equipment. BATOC will then communicate to  
pilots the BATOC commander's (or other here designated) determination  
concerning nav aids. On the basis of this information military pilots  
will determine which level of minima applies.

B. **CIVIL AIRCRAFT:** If electronic jamming occurs, civil pilots  
will apply their respective companies scale of minima based on the deter-  
mination made by the BATOC Commander (or other here designated).

[Note: Immediate consideration should be given to the pro-  
curement (if necessary) and handy storage of the necessary crystals for  
altering the frequencies of Berlin navigational aids. Likewise, if the  
Berlin radars do not have tuneable magnetrons, consideration should also  
be given to their procurement. It is assumed that other frequencies are  
available in the Allied frequency register.]

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PARTIAL TRANSCRIPTION - ORIGINAL FOLLOWS

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- . 4. SOVIET/GDR ATTEMPTED INTERCEPT OF ALLIED AIRCRAFT IN CORRIDORS.  
Attempted intercept as used here includes both shooting and non-shooting

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H. SOVIET/DDR ATTEMPTED INTERCEPT OF ALLIED AIRCRAFT IN CORRIDORS.

Attempted intercept as used here includes both shooting and non-shooting attempts at intercept.

A. MILITARY AIRCRAFT: A decision by Governments is needed whether military aircraft should obey or ignore Soviet or DDR attempted intercept in the Berlin air corridors. [It is recommended: Military aircraft ignore attempted intercept as long as they are assured by NATO that they are in one of the Berlin air corridors. Since there can be no legal intercept of Allied aircraft in the Berlin air corridors, it is assumed that interceptors will not open fire in the corridors.]

B. CIVIL AIRCRAFT: A decision by Governments is needed as in H.A. above.

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18 Nov 77/18 Copy # 2

TRIPARTITE "GARRISON AIRLIFT" PLAN

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